Consider the revenue-maximizing problem in which a single seller wants to sell k different items to a single buyer, who has independently distributed values for the items with additive valuation. The k = 1 case was completely resolved by Myerson's classical work in 1981, whereas for larger k the problem has been the subject of much research efforts ever since. Recently, Hart and Nisan analyzed two simple mechanisms: selling the items separately, or selling them as a single bundle. They showed that selling separately guarantees at least a c=log 2 k fraction of the optimal revenue; and for identically distributed items, bundling yields at least a c=log k fraction of the optimal revenue. In this paper, we prove that selling separately guarantees at least c=log k fraction of the optimal revenue, whereas for identically distributed items, bundling yields at least a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. These bounds are tight (up to a constant factor), settling the open questions raised by Hart and Nisan. The results are valid for arbitrary probability distributions without restrictions. Our results also have implications on other interesting issues, such as monotonicity and randomization of selling mechanisms.
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auction | mechanism design I n the multiple-items auction problem, a seller wants to sell k different items to n bidders who have private values, drawn from some probability distributions, for these items. Economists are interested in studying incentive-compatible mechanisms under which the bidders are incentivized to report their values truthfully. One central question is how to design such mechanisms that can yield the maximal expected revenue for the seller.
The single item case (k = 1) was resolved by Myerson's classic work (1) for independently distributed item values. The general case of multiple item (k > 1) is much subtler and not yet completely solved. In recent years, it has been the subject of intensive studies by both economists (e.g., refs. 2-7) and computer scientists (e.g., refs. [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . In particular, when the inputs are discrete, much progress has been made on the efficient computation of the optimal mechanism. Another line of investigation is to design simple mechanisms for approximating optimal revenues (13) (14) (15) in various situations, such as in the unit-demand setting. For fuller reviews and discussions of the literature, we refer the reader to the papers by Hart and Nisan (16), and Cai et al. (12) , and the references therein.
There remain important aspects of the multiple-item auction that are not yet well understood. Most of the known results put restrictions on the distributions (such as refs. 12, 15, and 17). As noted in ref. 16 , a precise characterization of optimal mechanisms is still wanting for general distributions, even for simple cases such as for one bidder and two items. The subtlety can be appreciated by considering the following three examples. If the two items are independent and identically distributed over values f0; 1g uniformly, then selling them separately at price $1 each yields revenue 1, which is better than bundling (with optimal bundle price $1 and revenue 3/4). However, if the values are uniform over f1; 2g, then selling them separately (at an optimal price of $2 each) yields revenue 2, which is worse than bundling them together for price $3, with revenue 3 · 3=4 = 2:25. In the third example, let F be the distribution that takes values f1; 2; 4g with probabilities f1=6; 1=2; 1=3g. In this case, the unique optimal mechanism (see ref. 7) is to offer the buyer the choice between a 50% lottery for buying any single item for $1, and buying both surely as a bundle for $4. (The reader may refer to refs. 3 and 16 for more examples and discussions.)
It is also not known how to characterize the optimal revenue (up to a constant factor) when there is one bidder and k items for large k; it is unsolved even for ER, the equal-revenue distribution as defined in ref. 16 (i.e., when all items have independent cumulative distributions FðxÞ = 1 − 1=x for x ≥ 1).
In the hope of addressing the above issues, Hart and Nisan (16) investigated the case of one bidder (n = 1) and k > 1. They obtained interesting structural results that are valid for all distributions, and applied them to obtain performance bounds on two natural mechanisms: selling each of the k items separately, and selling all of the k items as a single bundle. Specifically, they showed that selling separately guarantees at least a c=log 2 k fraction of the optimal revenue; and for identically distributed items, the bundling mechanism yields at least a c=log k fraction of the optimal revenue.
In this paper, we prove that selling separately guarantees at least c=log k fraction of the optimal revenue, whereas for identically distributed items, bundling yields at least a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. These bounds are tight (up to a constant factor), settling the open questions raised (16) . Our results also have implications on other interesting issues, such as monotonicity and randomization of the selling mechanisms.
It is worth emphasizing that our results are valid for arbitrary distributions without restrictions, in the same spirit as the results of ref. 16 . We present a technique called the "core-tails (CT) decomposition" (3. CT Decomposition and the Core Lemma) for analyzing the revenue of general distributions, which may be useful for removing the restrictions in previous works such as refs. 12 and 15.
Notations and Preliminaries
We follow the notations in ref. 16 . A mechanism for selling k items specifies a (possibly randomized) protocol between a seller and a buyer who has a private valuation x = ðx 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x k Þ (where x i ≥ 0) for the items. The outcome is an allocation specifying the probability q i ðxÞ of getting each of the k items and an (expected) payment s = sðxÞ from the buyer to the seller.
The buyer is assumed to act in his self-interest, behaving rationally (paying no more than his value for the goods received), and reporting his valuation x′ = ðx′ 1 ; . . . ; x′ k Þ of the k items so as to maximize his utility. Therefore, as is common in economics theory, we consider only mechanisms aligned with these two considerations, so that the buyer is willing to participate and has incentive to report truthfully (that is, x′ = x, the true valuation of the items). Precisely, we require the mechanism to be individually rational (IR) so that the buyer utility bðxÞ = P i x i q i ðxÞ − sðxÞ is nonnegative for all x, and also incentive compatible (IC) so that for all x; x′; P i x i q i ðxÞ − sðxÞ ≥ P i x i q i ðx′Þ − sðx′Þ. For a cumulative distribution F on R k + ðk ≥ 1Þ, let REV ðF Þ denote the maximal (expected) revenue E x ∼ F ðsðxÞÞ obtainable by any incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism. We consider two simple mechanisms: (i) selling each item separately, where each item i has a posted price p i so that the buyer can decide whether or not to take the item; and (ii) selling all of the items as a bundle with a fixed price, so that the buyer gets the whole bundle or nothing. It is easy to see that both mechanisms are IR and IC. Let SREV ðF Þ be the maximal revenue obtainable by selling each item separately, and BREV ðF Þ be the maximal revenue obtainable by selling all of the items as a bundle.
Let X = ðX 1 ; . . . ; X k Þ with values in R k + distributed according to F . The notation REV ðXÞ, SREV ðXÞ, BREV ðXÞ will be used interchangeably with REV ðF Þ, SREV ðF Þ, BREV ðF Þ. Note that we have SREV ðXÞ = REV ðX 1 Þ + ⋯ + REV ðX k Þ and BREV ðXÞ = REV ðX 1 + ⋯ + X k Þ.
In this paper, we consider only independently distributed item values, i.e., F = F 1 × ⋯ × F k , where F i is the cumulative distribution of item i and the F i values are not necessarily identical. Clearly,
For a one-dimensional distribution F, Myerson's characterization of the optimal values gives the following:
For k > 1, characterizing the optimal value REV ðF Þ is a subtler issue and has been the subject of extensive studies. Here, we only list some results from ref. 16 that will be needed for our paper. Hart and Nisan (16) raised the question whether the above two bounds can be replaced by c=log 2 k and c, respectively. Such bounds would be tight, as the choice of F i ðxÞ = 1 − 1=x for x ∈ ½1; ∞Þ (1 ≤ i ≤ k) achieves these lower bounds. [It was shown in ref. 16 that, for this F , SREV ðF Þ = θðkÞ and REV ðF Þ ≥BREV ðF Þ = θðk log kÞ.] Our main result is to answer this open question affirmatively.
We need the following structural results from ref. 16 as useful tools. First, it is obvious that Notation. Let Z be a k-dimensional random variable. For any (measurable) subset S of R k + , let 1 Z∈S be the indicator random variable that takes on the value 1 if Z ∈ S and 0 otherwise. We sometimes write 1 Z∈Si Z as 1 Si Z for brevity when there is no confusion. 
Main Results
Definition
where F i are independent one-dimensional distributions (not necessarily identical). Define the core of F to be the finite k-dimensional interval as follows:
Let X F be the random variable distributed according to F . Our first result is a structural theorem, identifying COREðF Þ as the critical domain that determines how much revenue can be extracted beyond simply selling each item separately.
Remarks: Without loss of generality, we can assume that r Fi < ∞ for all i; otherwise, Theorems 1-3 will be trivially true as all revenues will be infinite. Theorem 1. There exist constants c; c′ > 0 such that for every integer k ≥ 2 and every
Theorem 1 reduces the original problem dealing with distributions over infinite range into a problem over a finite range, making it possible to use the law of large numbers for our analysis.
Theorem 2. There exists a constant c > 0 such that for every integer k ≥ 2 and every
For identically distributed F i , we show that bundling achieves optimality to within a constant factor. Theorem 3 also gives insight into the issues of nonmonotonicity and randomization. Hart and Reny (7) observed a counter intuitive phenomenon: there exist one-dimensional distributions F 1 , F 2 where F 2 stochastically dominates F 1 (i.e., PrfX 2 > xg ≥ PrfX 1 > xg for all x), yet REV ðF 1 × F 1 Þ > REV ðF 2 × F 2 Þ. It raised an interesting open question how large this nonmonotonicity difference can get. Theorem 3 yields as easy corollary that the above anomalous ratio of the revenues is bounded by a constant. 
The corollary is true because BREV is monotonic in the sense that BREV ðF 2 Þ ≥ BREV ðF 1 Þ if F 2 stochastically dominates F 1 . Theorem 3 also implies a constant factor between the revenues of deterministic auctions versus randomized ones. Let DREV ðF Þ denote the maximum revenue derivable by any deterministic IC and IR mechanism. Noting that bundling is a deterministic mechanism, we have the following. Corollary 2. There exists a constant c > 0 such that for any k ≥ 2 and F = F × F × ⋯ × F(k times) where F is any one-dimensional distribution, DREV ðF Þ > cREV ðF Þ.
In the ensuing sections, we will prove Theorems 1 first, followed by Theorems 2 and 3. Theorem 1 provides the basis for focusing attention on COREðF Þ only in analyzing mechanisms such as SREV and BREV, while ignoring contributions involving any tail components. We first introduce this CT decomposition and study its properties in the next section, before proving Theorem 1 in Section 4.
CT Decomposition and the Core Lemma
In this section, we discuss a technique called CT decomposition for partitioning a multidimensional distribution into "core" and "tails," such that the optimal revenue can be effectively estimated by focusing only on the core part. This decomposition is key to our analysis of various mechanisms. We let k ≥ 2.
Thus, T 0 ̸ = COREðF Þ and the entire region R k + is decomposed into 2 k components:
We are interested in the tail distributions obtained by restricting F to T A where A ≠ 0 =. In fact, we will only be interested in those nonempty A for which all of its tail sections have positive weights. We give precise definitions in the following.
Definition: Define p Fi = 1 − F i ðkr Fi Þ = Pr x ∼ Fi fX > kr Fi g. Note that it is always the case that p Fi ≠ 1; otherwise, the revenue at price kr Fi is positive and equal to kr Fi , exceeding the maximum revenue r Fi , which is a contradiction.
Definition: A subset A⊆f1; 2; . . . ; kg is said to be proper (relative to F ), if A ≠ 0 = and p Fi > 0 (and hence r Fi > 0) for all i ∈ A. Denote the collection of all proper subsets by A.
We next define formally the tail distribution obtained by restricting F to T A , for any proper A ∈ A. To do so, we first split each one-dimensional distribution F i at x = kr Fi into two distributions F 
It is easy to check that F C i ðxÞ and F T i ðxÞ are continuous from the right and monotone nondecreasing in their values ranging from 0 to 1, and thus are indeed valid distributions. We are now ready to define the family of tail distributions of F .
Definition: For any proper subset A ∈ A, let A = fi 1 < i 2 < ⋯ < i m g and A = fj 1 < j 2 < ⋯ < j k−m g. Define
Core be the resulting distribution defined over region T A . We refer to the family of distributions fF A jA ∈ Ag as the tail distributions of F induced by the CT decomposition.
Note also that the probability that the value of X F falls in the region T A is equal to p 
Finally, we finish this section with some bounds on the basic parameters of
The Core Lemma. We now prove a key structural result, which isolates the contributions of the tail regions from that of the core region.
Proof: By Subdomain Stitching (Lemma B) and Eq. 2, we have
where we used the fact that 1 TA X F = 0 if A ∉ A. For any A ∈ A, Lemma A of 1. Notations and Preliminaries implies the following:
Note that, by Eq. 1,
where we have used Lemma 1 to conclude ∏ m ℓ=1 ð1 − p ℓ Þ −1 ≤ 4. We have from Eqs. 3-5 that
As all p i ≤ 1=k by Lemma 1,
We have thus proved Lemma 3. 
Noting p i ≤ 1=k from Lemma 1, we have X
It follows from Eq. 6 and Lemma 3 (the Core Lemma) that
where c = 8e − 7 and c′ = 
Now, by standard argument,
Note that
Therefore,
The integral on the RHS satisfies the following:
Thus, 6. Proof of Theorem 3 By assumption, F i = F and hence
1=e. Let Y be the random variable distributed according to F C , we consider two cases as follows.
Theorem 1 implies and by Chebycheff's inequality, It follows that, by selling the k items as a bundle at price
Also, observe that
[8]
It follows from Theorem 1 and Eqs. 7 and 8 that
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Remarks: As pointed out by a reviewer, the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 actually show stronger results in special cases: in Theorem 2, if F i is supported on ½0; kr i , then REV ðF i Þ ≥ ðc=log kÞEðF i Þ; in Theorem 3, if F is supported on ½0; kr, then BREV ðF × ⋯ × FÞ ≥ ckEðFÞ.
